It Can Be Irrational to Knowingly Choose the Best by Gallow, J. Dmitri
It Can Be Irrational to Knowingly Choose the
Best
j. dmitri gallow ∗
In some decisions, causal decision theory (CDT) requires you to choose whichever
option you predict you will choose. That is: in these decisions, CDT demands that
you verify your own prediction about what you’ll do. In other decisions, CDT forbids
you from choosing whichever option you predict you will choose. That is, in these
decisions, CDT demands that you falsify your own prediction about what you’ll do.
Some heterodox causalists object to both of these kinds of prediction-sensitivity
(see, in particular, Barnett, forthcoming, Gallow, 2020, and Podgorski, forthcoming).
They say that what you ought to do does not depend upon what you predict you will do.
Their decision theories are prediction-insensitive. However, one heterodox causalist
(Spencer, 2021) thinks that there’s nothing objectionable about prediction-sensitivity
per se. He says that, while you are never required to falsify your prediction, you are
sometimes required to verify your prediction.
Spencer (forthcoming) presents an argument against prediction-insensitive causal-
ists. He points out that their theories appear to conflict with the plausible principle
Knowingly If you know that you will choose an option, x, and you know x is better
than every other option available to you, then it is permissible for you to choose
x.
I agree with Spencer that prediction-insensitive causalists should reject this principle.
However, I disagree insofar as he thinks that he and orthodox causalists are in a better
position to accept it. In fact, both orthodox CDT and his own heterodox theory appear
to contradict Knowingly in exactly the kinds of cases in which prediction-insensitive
causalists apparently contradict it. My own view is that we should all deny the princi-
ple. We should all accept that it can be irrational to knowingly choose the best. But,
whether you agree with me about this or not, I hope to persuade you that Know-
ingly does not favour orthodox CDT and Spencer’s theory over prediction-insensitive
causalism. The reason is that, for the plausible ways that Spencer or an orthodox
causalist may attempt to square their theory with Knowingly, a prediction-insensitive
causalist may just as plausibly square their theory with Knowingly in a similar way.
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1 | prediction-sensitivity
CDT says that you should choose whichever option has the highest utility, U , where





Here, each k is a state of nature, C is your credence function, and D measures your
desires. If you’re in the state k, then CDT says that the objective value of choosing x is
given by D(x∧ k), so U (x) is your subjective expectation of x’s objective value.
Consider the following decision.
Amelia must choose between two envelopes labelled ‘a’ and ‘b’. Yesterday,
her fairy godfather made a prediction about which envelope she would
choose. If he predicted a (‘ka’), then he put $1 in a. If he predicted b
(‘kb’), then he put $2 in b. Amelia is certain that he predicted correctly.
Conditional on Amelia choosing a, she knows for sure that her fairy godfather pre-
dicted she would choose a. And, conditional on her choosing b, she knows for sure
that he predicted she would choose b. Then, her credence in ka will be her credence
that she chooses a, and her credence in kb will be her credence that she chooses b,
C(ka) = C(a) and C(kb) = C(b).
Assuming Amelia’s desires are linear in dollars, the utility of a is her credence that she
takes a, and the utility of b is two times her credence that she takes b,
U (a) = C(a) and U (b) = 2 ·C(b).
Whether U (a) or U (b) is higher depends upon Amelia’s predictions about what she
will choose. So long as she is confident enough that she’ll select a/b, CDT says a/b is
required. So in this decision, CDT demands that Amelia verify her prediction.
Prediction-insensitive causalists say that you should make up your mind about
what to do in a way which is independent of what you predict you will do. In a choice
between two options, x and y, Barnett, Gallow, and Podgorski all advise you to look





C(k | y) ·D(x∧ k)
is the utility x has, conditional on you selecting y. Then, R(x,y) def= Ux(x) − Ux(y)
measures how much better than y you will expect x to be, conditional on you choosing
x. (‘R’ for ratifiability.) If R(x,y) > R(y,x), then prediction-insensitive causalists say
that x is required. Spencer names this rule ‘MaxRat’. Applied to Amelia’s decision,
R(a,b) = Ua(a) −Ua(b) = 1 and R(b,a) = Ub(b) −Ub(a) = 2, so MaxRat says that b
is required, no matter what Amelia predicts about how she’ll choose.
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§2 spencer’s argument against maxrat
In contrast, Spencer (2021) says that, in a choice between two options, if you cur-
rently expect that x is better than y, and you would continue to think this as you grow
more confident that you will select x, then x is required. That is, if both U (x) > U (y)
and Ux(x) > Ux(y), then x is required. Call this ‘Spencer’s Rule’. Applied to Amelia’s
decision, if she is 80% sure that she’ll choose a, then U (a) = 0.8 > 0.4 = U (b) and
Ua(a) = 1 > 0 =Ua(b). So Spencer’s Rule says that a is required.
2 | spencer’s argument against maxrat
Suppose Amelia knows that she will take a. Because she knows that the predictions
are accurate, she knows that she will take a iff a contains $1 and b contains $0. So, if
she knows that she will take a, then she knows that a is better than b. So Knowingly
says that it is permissible to take a. But MaxRat disagrees. So MaxRat and Knowingly
are inconsistent. But Spencer contends that Knowingly is “undeniable”. So Spencer
concludes that we should reject MaxRat.
Someone might object that it’s not possible for Amelia to know that she will take
a, but I don’t think we should. A resolute intention to choose a gives Amelia fantas-
tic evidence that she will choose a. She may have a long history of always following
through on her resolute intentions. Barring inductive scepticism, Amelia is in a posi-
tion to know that she’ll choose a. Nor should it matter whether this choice is rational.
In general, we should acknowledge that
Irrationality is knowable It is possible to know that you’ll choose x, even if x is irra-
tional.
Some may object that it’s not possible for Amelia to know that the prediction is
accurate, but I don’t think we should. So long as her choices are predictable, there’s
no reason why Amelia herself couldn’t come to know that they’ve been accurately pre-
dicted. In general, we should acknowledge that
Predictability is knowable It is possible to know that your choice was accurately pre-
dicted.
We could grant all this but deny that Amelia can know that a is better than b. But,
again, I do not think we should. We should acknowledge that
Knowledge is closed If your belief that ψ was formed by competently deducing it
from beliefs, ϕ1,ϕ2, . . . ,ϕN , which jointly entail ψ, then, if you know each of
ϕ1,ϕ2, . . . ,ϕN , you know that ψ.
Suppose that Amelia formed her belief that a is better than b by competently deducing
it from her knowledge that she will take a and her knowledge that the prediction is
accurate, together with her knowledge that, if she will take a and the prediction is
accurate, then a is better than b. Then, Knowledge is closed tells us that Amelia knows
that a is better than b.
Knowingly then tells us that it is permissible for Amelia to take a, which conflicts
with MaxRat. I do not wish to reject any of these assumptions, so I accept the conclu-
sion: MaxRat contradicts Knowingly.
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3 | an argument against cdt and spencer’s rule
ButMaxRat is not alone. With similar assumptions, both Spencer’s Rule and orthodox
CDT also contradict Knowingly. Consider the following decision:
Casey must choose between two envelopes labelled ‘c’ and ‘d’. Yesterday,
his fairy godmother made a prediction about which he would choose. If
she predicted c, (‘kc’), she put $1 in c and nothing in d. If she predicted d
(‘kd ’), she put $1/ϵ (for some ϵ > 0) in d and nothing in c.
Suppose Casey’s credence that he will take c is 1 − ϵ, and he knows that he will take
c. Assuming that Casey knows that the predictions are accurate, he knows he will
take c iff c contains $1 and d contains nothing. So, if he knows he will take c, then he
knows that c contains more money than d, and so he knows that c is better than d. So
Knowingly says that it is permissible for Casey to take c.
But both orthodox CDT and Spencer’s Rule disagree. Because Casey’s credence
that he will take c is 1 − ϵ, his credence in kc is 1 − ϵ, and his credence in kd is ϵ. So
the utility of c is
U (c) = C(kc) ·D(c∧ kc) +C(kd) ·D(c∧ kd)
= (1− ϵ) · 1+ ϵ · 0
= 1− ϵ
whereas the utility of d is
U (d) = C(kc) ·D(d ∧ kc) +C(kd) ·D(d ∧ kd)
= (1− ϵ) · 0+ ϵ · (1/ϵ)
= 1
So orthodox CDT says that c is impermissible, and d is required. Since the utility of
d would continue to exceed the utility of c if you were to select d, Ud(d) = 1/ϵ > 0 =
Ud(c), Spencer’s Rule agrees. So both contradict Knowingly.
You may object that it’s not possible for Casey to know that he will take c. I disagree.
I think we are typically in a position to know that we will choose an option on the basis
of our intention to do so, independent of whether that option is rational. And I do not
think that this knowledge requires certainty; for small enough ϵ, having a credence of
1 − ϵ that you will choose x does not preclude you from knowing that you’ll choose
x, so long as your evidence is good enough, and you in fact do choose x. But suppose
you disagree, and you think that Casey cannot know he will take c. Just for illustration,
suppose you think that knowledge is sensitive to the stakes of your practical situation.
Then, like Fantl & McGrath (2002), you may say that you know ϕ only if it is rational
for you to act as ifϕ. And you may suggest that, since it is not rational for Casey to act
as if he will take c, he cannot know that he will take c. Let’s not dwell on the fact that,
for good reason, Fantl & McGrath restrict their principle so that it does not apply when
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§4 knowledge and expectation
you exercise causal control over whether ϕ.1 The important point is this: a defender
of MaxRat could just as plausibly say that it is not rational for Amelia to act as if she
will take a. Applying Fantl & McGrath’s principle in the same way, they could then
conclude that Amelia cannot know she will take a.
The point isn’t that Amelia and Casey’s situation is symmetric. If you accept Spencer’s
Rule, then you’ll recognise an important asymmetry between Casey and Amelia: Casey’s
choice is irrational while Amelia’s is rational. The point is rather that there is a dialecti-
cal symmetry between Spencer’s Rule andMaxRat. If pragmatic encroachment allows
a proponent of Spencer’s Rule to deny that Casey knows what he’ll choose, it likewise
allows a proponent of MaxRat to deny that Amelia knows what she’ll choose.
Some may object that it’s not possible for Casey to know that the prediction is
accurate. Again, I don’t think we should. But, more importantly: it looks like any
plausible reason you may have for denying that Casey can know the prediction made
about him is accurate is a reason a proponent of MaxRat could use to deny that Amelia
can know that the prediction made about her is accurate.
We could grant both that Casey knows that he will take c and that he knows that the
prediction is accurate. Even so, we could deny that Casey is in a position to know that
c is better than d, by denying that Knowledge is closed. But I don’t see any plausible
reason to deny this instance of closure which couldn’t equally well be offered as a reason
to deny the instance of closure we used in arguing that Amelia was in a position to
know that a is better than b.
So it seems to me that the argument that CDT and Spencer’s Rule contradict
Knowingly is just as strong as Spencer’s argument that MaxRat contradicts Know-
ingly. And it seems to me that the plausible defences available to CDT and Spencer’s
Rule are equally well available to MaxRat.
4 | knowledge and expectation
Spencer (forthcoming) does not discuss decisions like Casey’s, but he does offer a rea-
son to think that Casey cannot know that c is better than d. When discussing an un-
related objection to Knowingly, Spencer claims that you cannot know that x is better
than y if U (y) > U (x) (fn. 16). I believe the idea is this: utility is your subjective ex-
pectation of objective value. So, ifU (y) > U (x), then y is better than x in expectation.
And if y is better than x in expectation, then you cannot know that x is better than y.
Knowledge and expectation If your expectation of y’s value is greater than your ex-
pectation of x’s value, then you cannot know that x is better than y.
Compare: if your expectation of Emilia’s height is greater than your expectation of
Grant’s height, then you cannot know that Grant is taller than Emilia.
Knowledge and expectation entails that Casey cannot know that c is better than
d, for U (d) > U (c). And it allows that Amelia can know that a is better than b, since
U (a) > U (b).
1. In their first appendix
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It’s important to recognise that, just because this principle applies to Casey and not
to Amelia, this doesn’t automatically break the dialectical symmetry between MaxRat
and Spencer’s Rule. Suppose you accept the principle and conclude that Casey can’t
know that c is better than d. It could still turn out that the best explanation for why
Casey can’t know c is better than d would tell a proponent of MaxRat that Amelia
doesn’t know a is better than b. After all, if we accept the principle, and we accept that
Knowledge is closed, then we will have to deny that Casey knows one of the following:
(1) he will choose c; (2) the prediction is accurate; and (3) if he chooses c and the
prediction is accurate, then c is better than d. As I said in §3, whatever we say about
why Casey doesn’t know (1), (2), or (3), it looks like similar reasoning could allow a
proponent of MaxRat to say something similar about Amelia.
In any event, we should reject Knowledge and expectation. The principle can
sound more plausible than it should if we’re not careful to distinguish what’s expected
in the everyday sense from what’s expected in the sense of mathematical expectation.
To appreciate the difference, suppose you’re 50% sure that Emilia is 5 feet tall and 50%
sure than she is 7 feet tall. Then, your (mathematical) expectation of Emilia’s height
is 6 feet. But, in the everyday sense, you do not expect Emilia to be 6 feet tall—after
all, you’re certain that she’s not 6 feet tall! Or suppose you know for sure that Grant
is 6 feet tall, and you’re 1− ϵ sure that Emilia is 5 feet tall, but there’s an ϵ probability
that she’s been zapped by a growth ray gun and is now 2/ϵ feet tall. Then, your math-
ematical expectation of Emilia’s height is greater than your mathematical expectation
of Grant’s height. But you do not, in the everyday sense, expect Emilia to be taller than
Grant—after all, you’re nearly certain that Grant is taller than Emilia! Moreover, so
long as you can know that the ϵ probability event did not obtain, you can know that
Grant is taller than Emilia, in spite of the fact that your expectation of Emilia’s height is
greater than your expectation of Grant’s. And in exactly the same way, you can know
that x is better than y, in spite of the fact that your expectation of y’s value is greater
than your expectation of x’s.
5 | knowing
There is another noteworthy respect in which Spencer’s theory andMaxRat are in sim-
ilar dialectical positions. Spencer (forthcoming, fn 17) briefly discusses the principle
Knowing If you know that x is better than every other option available to you, then it
is permissible for you to choose x.
Spencer’s theory of rational choice contradicts Knowing. To appreciate why, consider
this decision:
Imogen must choose between two envelopes, labelled ‘i’ and ‘j ’. If her
fairy godfather predicted she’d choose i, he put $10 in j and nothing in i.
If he predicted j , he put $2 in i and $1 in j . Imogen is certain he predicted
correctly.
In Imogen’s decision, Ui(i) < Ui(j) and Uj (j) < Uj (i). So Spencer’s Rule is silent.
But Spencer’s full theory of rational choice is not. It tells Imogen she must choose j .
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Roughly, in a choice between two options, x and y, if Ux(x) < Ux(y) and Uy(y) <
Uy(x), then Spencer says: if Ux(x) > Uy(y), then x is required (see Spencer, 2021, for
details and caveats). In Imogen’s decision, Ui(i) = 0 < 1 = Uj (j). So Spencer’s theory
tells Imogen that she is required to take j , no matter what she predicts about what she’ll
do.
But now suppose Imogen knows that she will choose j . Then, she knows that her
fairy godfather predicted that she’d choose j , and so knows that i contains $2 whereas j
contains only $1. So she knows that i is better than every other option available to her.
Knowing says that it is permissible for Imogen to choose i. But Spencer disagrees. So
he rejects Knowing. In fn 17, Spencer (forthcoming) says that decisions like Imogen’s
are counterexamples to Knowing.
Speaking for myself: considered in the abstract, I feel the intuitive pull of Knowing
and Knowingly equally. And I’m just as inclined to take Amelia’s decision to be a
counterexample toKnowingly as I am inclined to take Imogen’s to be a counterexample
to Knowing. If it is a cost of a theory that it rejects Knowingly, it seems to me that it
should likewise be a cost that a theory rejects Knowing. Moreover, once Knowing is
denied, it seems to me that there’s little additional cost to denying Knowingly as well.
So while these kinds of principles may favour orthodox CDT over both MaxRat and
Spencer’s theory, it doesn’t seem to me that they favour Spencer’s theory over MaxRat.
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